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Foreword
The Economic Transition and Integration (ETI) Project at the International Institute for
Applied Systems Analysis (IIASA) started a research activity on the behavior of Rus-
sian enterprises under liberalization, privatization and restructuring in 1995{1996. This
activity originated upon the initiative of the Ministry of Economy of the Russian Fed-
eration. The major reason for focusing on this subject was the fact that the current
state and further transformation of Russian medium and large sized enterprises became
a challenge for the continuation and success of transition related reforms. Despite cer-
tain positive tendencies, numerous enterprises still adjust themselves to ongoing changes
without considerable market adaptation and modernization. The emerging ownership
structure and nancial markets demonstrate limited positive inuence on stockholders'
incentives, decision-making process and strategies of restructuring.
In the course of these enterprise studies, a workshop on \Russian Enterprises on the
Path of Market Adaptation and Restructuring" was organized at IIASA on 1{3 February
1996. Russian and Western experts, extensively working in the area of enterprise perfor-
mance under transition, focused the discussions on recent empirical ndings and analyses
concerning the following issues: typical models of enterprise behavior; development of the
nancial situation at the enterprises and its determinants; impact of emerging markets
and competition on enterprises; the consequences of privatization and patterns of restruc-
turing; and enterprise social assets divestiture and conversion. The workshop arrived at
both analytical conclusions and recommendations for policy measures stimulating \con-
structive" enterprise behavior. Possibilities for a joint research project on the motivations
and behavior of enterprises in transition economies were also discussed.
The circulation of selected workshop papers as IIASA Working Papers is undertaken
in order to provoke broad discussions of presented analytical results. This study by
Dr. Andrey Klepach reveals interlinkages between the transformation of the former state
enterprises into market-oriented companies and macroeconomic equilibrium.
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Financial Position of Russian
Enterprises under Transformational
Crisis
Andrey Klepach

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to analyze the nancial position of Russian enterprises under
conditions of transformational crisis. The analysis is based on the ocial statistics and
enterprise surveys. The main thesis is that the change of a state-owned plan-regulated
enterprise to a capitalist-oriented rm creates sustainable nancial disequilibrium. This
disequilibrium takes the form of the shortage of revenues for nancing enterprise invest-
ment and maintaining its production and labor potential. Most enterprises adapt to the
new economy of shortages through the sharp reduction of output, employment cuts and
the increase of debt.
The nance deciency is constantly propagated in the course of price competition of
sectors for the share of cumulative income and the high cost-push ination related to it,
as well as in the change of production structure in favor of sectors with low value added.
In 1994{1995, the transformational crisis moved to a new stage. A considerable num-
ber of enterprises have learned to survive in the crisis situation and their behavior with
respect to production is increasingly determined by eective demand and nancial condi-
tions. While the change from the planned economy to market-nancial regulation can be
regarded as virtually completed, macroeconomic equilibrium which implies a substantial
change of macroeconomic conditions, remains a long-term prospect.
1 The Enterprise in the Transformational Crisis
The nancial and production behavior of Russian enterprises in 1992{1995 was determined
by a combination of various crisis (non-equilibrium) processes:
 The change of a state-owned enterprise that used to operate in the planned, govern-
ment-run economy of shortages, to a market-oriented capitalist corporation. This
is one of the aspects of the transformational crisis and resulting output decline [3,
4, 11, 12];

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 The Soviet industrial model characterized by the high resources to output ratio,
militarization and the limited consumption complex of poor quality has expended
itself [6, Nos. 3, 4{5];
 The demand and production squeeze resulting from the nancial stabilization policy
(the reduction of government expenditure, contraction of credit emission and an
increase in the real interest rates);
 The depreciation of nancial assets and decreased propensity for investment result-
ing from high ination, with the factors of inertia, costs, sectoral rivalry mostly
prevailing over those of demand and monetary policy [6, 9].
In the course of conventional cyclical demand-determined crises, enterprises expropri-
ate stocks and cut back on borrowing, which increases self-nancing despite a decrease in
the rate of return. In the depression phase, investment in stocks and liquid assets grows.
At Russian enterprises undergoing transformational crisis, the structure of assets and lia-
bilities has a dierent pattern. Despite the trend towards the stabilization of production
in 1994{95, the enterprises' solvency and the share of investment in liquid assets kept
declining (although at a slower rate), which suggests that the process of depressive stabi-
lization was not over yet. Thus, one can describe the situation at the beginning of 1996
as the stagnation phase rather than sustained stabilization of the enterprises' economic
and nancial position.
Under the concept of transformational decline, output decline is inevitable as the
plan-induced compulsion to extensively utilize most of the capacities is removed and un-
protable products are discarded [3, 4]. This \shedding" of uneconomic behavior was
supposed to have resulted in the improvement of enterprises' nancial position after a
period of adaptation to price liberalization and the contraction of government subsidies.
However, in the process of change from 1992 to 1995 the Russian economy was charac-
terized by the steadily reproduced distortions of the volume and structure of fund and
resource ows, lack of coordination in the movement of the functional forms of capital
(commodity, productive and nancial capital).
Disequilibrium that has taken the form of a considerable number of loss-making enter-
prises nding themselves on the brink of bankruptcy may be explained by the following
factors: (i) the process of the state-owned, plan-abiding enterprise conversion to the
private capitalist corporation is not over yet, (ii) the ecient mechanisms of insolvent
enterprises' sanation are lacking, and (iii) governmental deation policy is not stringent
enough.
However, the inconsistency of the government's nancial policy and the endogeneza-
tion of money supply, the ineciency of sanation mechanisms need to be explained as
such, which includes explanation at the microlevel. The capitalization process of enter-
prise behavior generates crisis processes itself as it requires substantial restructuring of
enterprise assets in favor of nancial capital, brings about tighter budget constraints, is
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accompanied by increased uncertainty in the enterprise environment and the instability
of contractual relations between economic agents [8, 11].
The lack of partnership between economic agents, the burden of structural dispro-
portions in the Russian economy, inadequate monetary and scal policy coupled with
the intensive cost-push ination, cause the enterprise adaptation to the demand squeeze
and nancial constraints to go along the paths of output and investment cuts, arrears
and a fall in liquidity rather than curbing price growth and reducing costs. It is not so
much a monetary economy as a debt economy that is being formed [9, 10]. From the
position of the superstructure over the mechanism of self-nancing, the inter-enterprise
arrears and arrears to the nancial sector are turning into the leading factor for enterprise
survival. These are becoming the price enterprises have to pay for preserving the produc-
tion/technological potential and social infrastructure. They also are the shock-absorber
of inter-sectoral and corporate contradictions.
The transformational crisis in the Russian economy is now entering its second stage:
the rst stage (1992{1993) | the disintegration of the centralized planning system
and transition from the seller's to the buyer's market in the situation of an acute sales
crisis, deregulated (in general), but non-equilibrium prices; the second stage (1994{
1996?) | the increase in enterprise adaptability to the crisis, with the intermediate
demand coming to the fore with regard to the regulation of production, the restriction of
inter-enterprise arrears and the tightening of nancial relations.
The second stage of the crisis is marked by the depressive stabilization of production
and a slow-down of ination. However, it is too early to mention either the beginning
of recovery (in 1996, it is buoyancy at best) or the end of transformation in the sense of
attaining macroeconomic balance and the formation of ecient businesses capable both
of survival and strategic development.
It is not unlikely that in Russia, the transformational crisis will not result in the for-
mation of a rm (even a managerial-type rm) with the free, self-sucient development of
nancial capital. Instead, it may be a kind of company-family, (a corporation-community
comparable to the Japanese corporation) where the capital ow is subordinated to the
retention and renewal of \a rm's identity", its human, network and productive capital
[2, 7].
2 From Loose to Tight Budget Constraints: The
Change of Structure of Enterprises' Active and
Passive Operations
In the course of reforms, Russian enterprises have encountered a tightening of nancial
constraints which was qualitative rather than quantitative in nature. The persistent
shortage of current assets and the \bureaucratic withdrawal of prots" inherent to the
centralized planning system were considerably relaxed in the late eighties, as the change to
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\full cost-accounting and self-nancing" was taking place. The share of prots transferred
to the budget dropped from 60% in 1980 to 49% in 1988 (the share of retained earnings
increased from 36% to 41%). During this period of \creeping" into the transition phase,
loose budget constraints became even more relaxed, while enterprise behavior became
more nancially (capitalist)-oriented.
1992{1995 saw a radical change of the functional role of enterprise nance and, in
spite of arrears, a drastic tightening of nancial constraints. From the perspective of
reproduction enterprise nancial constraints can be roughly divided into two groups:
1. Constraints on the income side | receipts from sales, enterprises' disposable
income (value added, net prots).
2. Budget constraints | suciency of their own funds, the possibility to cover the
shortage of their own funds by external nancing, the level of solvency.
In our view, the criterion of nancial constraints tightness should not be reduced to the
costs of external nancing [4]. The number of bankruptcies in the transitional economy
cannot be used as a measure either. In the situation of external nancing contraction, a
more appropriate measure is the costs of survival through self-nancing, which implies that
the level of entrepreneurial activities (e.g., output) matches the ow of receipts and the
accumulation of capital. The additional factors of the tightening of nancial constraints
are the uncertainty of nancing terms, high risks involved in attracting external resources
and investment, and the deformation of the passive assets structure towards short-term
investment.
2.1 Relative Isolation of Financial Capital from Production
Capital
The disbalancing of capital turnover is quite peculiar compared to the money squeeze
situation in the Russian economy. It is assumed that the indicator of the shortage of
nancial resources is the acceleration of their turnover rate (money velocity) against a
certain level which can be estimated as balanced. For the monetary sphere, it could be
considered that this level was reached in mid-1991 when, following the partial adjustment
and liberalization of prices (Pavlov's reforms), a relative equilibrium had been achieved
on the consumer and investment goods markets [10]. The ratio of money supply M1 to
GDP rose from 64% in 1985 to 74{76% in 1990{1991 when, in the course of the mass
switch-over to self-nancing, enterprises considerably increased their current assets (an
almost 50% growth versus the average level of the 80s). At the same time, this increase, is
partially related to the accumulation of excess inventory and the onset of the receivables
growth (Table 3).
The price liberalization and the ensuing high ination led to a sharp increase in
money turnover velocity (5{6 times), while the rate of enterprise working capital turnover
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dropped rather than increased. With production having declined practically by half over
four years, the period of working capital turnover increased from 160 days in 1991 to 280
days in 1992 and then decreased to 140 days (near pre-reforms level) (Table 4). At the
same time, the turnover rate of the net working capital (less payables) increased, though
to a lesser degree than money velocity (the former fell from 116 to 70 shipment days).
Under these conditions, the restoration of the pre-crisis output requires a considerable
increase in the capital turnover rate or its amount, but the demand for current assets can-
not be estimated without taking into account shifts in their structure. While the supplies
(so-called material parts) accounted for almost 70% in the structure of the current assets
of a resource-oriented state-owned enterprise, at a transitional-type enterprise operating
in the ination and decline environment, nancial assets are prevalent (about 60%) (Ta-
ble 3). By the estimates of managers (CEOs), based on surveys, the shortage of supplies
amounts to nearly 50%.
A much discussed report by the Federal Agency for Insolvency (Bankruptcies) (FUDN)
states that the main causes of the arrears are the predatory use of borrowed funds by the
senior managers of large enterprises and the generation of deciency of capital serving
production purposes. The way the FUDN sees it, is the prot-producing assets include
inventory and advance payments to the suppliers. Such an approach raises serious objec-
tions. Radical changes in the structure of the Russian enterprises' working capital are a
fact of life. However, there are no abuses on the part of the senior managers (though they
do occur, and the implemented privatization model has paved the way for them) that play
the crucial role here. Rather, this is inherent to the change of a \self-nanced" enterprise
working under a government agency (branch ministry) to a capitalist-type corporation
operating under the conditions of an unprecedented crisis.
To begin with, the functioning of capital does not only need material components,
but at the very least, also funds in bank accounts. In the situation of demand deciency,
the swelling of stocks slows the turnover and raises costs rather than increases prots.
The level of stocks in industry was relatively stable in 1992{1993 (nearly 100 days) and
dropped to 55{60 days in 1995. The internal contradictions inherent in the accumulation
of the prot-producing assets are indicated by a change in the stocks structure. In the
economy, the ratio of the nished goods inventory to stocks rose from 26% in 1991 to 50%
in 1992 which, to a great extent, was a transformation-based eect (the Kornai eect of
transition to the market behavior model). In the rst quarter of 1994, this ratio was 60%
which had been caused by the demand deciency and the spread of barter trade.
Thus, a large part of working capital, materialized in production (\nished goods"
and production assets), is, in fact, isolated from the further stages of production and
prot-making. To a great extent, the working capital increases due to the nancial super-
structure (cash and receivables). While in 1989 nancial or borrowed capital (nancial
assets less funds in current accounts) amounted to about 15% of industrial enterprises'
current assets, in 1992{1995 it was nearly 60{65%. The transformation of an enterprise
into a quasi-bank is due not only to the peculiar features of the Russian economy of short-
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ages, but also to the general nature of a \simple" production entity change to an agent of
the economy, of nancial (and credit) markets, and to the increase in transaction costs.
At the same time, the nancial component of working capital plays a major role
in maintaining the production process, i.e., it is not entirely isolated from the prot-
producing assets. This takes a number of forms: (a) the receivables and payables make
up for the eective demand and funds deciency; (b) transition to the market economy
deprives money of the passive role that it used to play under centralized planning and
enhances the importance of money capital in the turnover process; and (c) the liquidity
level turns into a criterion of survival and production regulator.
What is really decient is not the current assets or tangible prot-producing means.
Rather, these are highly liquid, mobile (primarily, nancial) resources (from the side of
enterprise assets) and their own funds (from the side of enterprise liabilities). As current
assets become increasingly sucient, the level of mobile funds suciency (including the
balances of hard currency accounts) in industry fell from 18 days in 1991 to ve days in
the rst half of 1995. The shortage of highly liquid current assets is a microreection of
the general money shortage, but it has its peculiarities. Primarily, it is the support of
liquidity by means of hard currency accumulation, hence a relatively heavy dependence
of enterprise nance on the exchange rate and exports, which was fully reected in the
introduction of the exchange rate corridor. In addition to this, in 1995 payments with
Treasury bonds, the development of the GKO (T-Bill) market, and an intensication of
the property intertwining process have caused enterprises to increase short and long-term
nancial assets (that exceeded the money balances more than twice).
2.2 Forced Self-nancing and the Burden of Arrears
In the late 80s, industry was developing in the direction of self-nancing, however the
transformation crisis coupled with the liberal monetarist model made enterprises depen-
dent on borrowed funds (the share of their own funds fell from 50{60% to 20% of the
working capital). In 1992{1993, the spiral of arrears originated; the increase in the re-
ceivables entailed the growth of payables at a more rapid pace (because prices for raw
materials and supplies were rising faster than those for manufacturing). High ination
depreciated the accumulated arrears, while the seigniorage was conned to the drop in
money balances in enterprises' accounts (Table 6). The nature of payables and receivables
changed at the beginning of the second half of 1994. The opportunities of arrears osetting
sharply decreased as payment relations were becoming tougher, and the attractiveness of
nancing through borrowing diminished due to a decrease in ination.
The disbalance between liquid assets and debts was reected in a drop in solvency
ratios and the contraction of production expenses. While the current liquidity ratio
exceeded the bankruptcy-safe level in 1992 (the ratio of current assets to current liabilities
was 2:1), in mid-1995, practically all sectors became formal bankrupts (current liquidity
ratio of 1.2). The crucial part of the solvency is the availability of funds to meet debt
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obligations. While the recommended ratio is 0.2{0.3:1 (which was characteristic of late
1991{beginning 1992), the actual level by the beginning of 1995 was 0.1:1 (for cash |
0.05) (Table 5). Under these conditions, the payables begin to depend on the lack of
gross prots rather than on the receivables. From the source of output support, they are
increasingly turning into a barrier for production.
The insolvency of enterprises and an increase in the share of loss-making enterprises
(up to 26% of industrial enterprises in 1995 versus 10{11% in 1990{1991) is another
token of the capital turnover disbalance and the conict between the structural realities
of the Russian economy and price liberalization. Let us point out the following essential
characteristics:
(a) The lack of prots and other sources of the enterprise own funds. According to
Belousov's estimate, the surplus of the real sector prots (with depreciation charges
included) which was 6% of GDP in 1991 (21% of enterprises' requirement) was
replaced in 1992 by the decit of 16% of GDP (27% income requirement), and in
1994 amounted to 17% of GDP (33% of requirement) [6, Nos. 4{5]. This decit is
spurred on by the growth of costs of supplies (especially the costs of energy which
rose to 16{17% against 6% in the 80s). In addition, a considerable portion of prot
is inationary and swallowed by arrears.
(b) The structure of prots changed sharply in favor of the fuel and energy sector and
export-oriented metallurgy (almost double compared to the pre-reform period). The
price these sectors had to pay for their leadership was having to act as a forced donor
to the manufacturing industry through the customers' arrears [6].
(c) The enterprises switch-over to self-nancing (inter-enterprise arrears were the inter-
nal source of nancing for industry as a whole) was forced as the outside nancial
support from banks and the budget sharply declined (Table 1). The swelling of com-
mercial lending was encouraged in 1993{1994 by the expensiveness of bank loans,
which was indicated by the interest rates exceeding the rate of return, given the
turnover rate (Table 2) [1, 5, 6].
In 1995, the potential of redistributing resources within industry through arrears to
suppliers was expending itself. With decreasing protability the arrears-ridden industry
has to apply for borrowed funds. However, the fragility of nancial markets, the generally
low savings, expensive and unaordable bank loans block the normal market mechanisms
of channelling populations savings to industry, which has led to an increase in enterprise
arrears to the budget.
By the amounts of loans extended in the form of tax arrears, the budget has already
replaced the banking sector. While in late 1994, tax arrears in industry were about 80%
of the debt to commercial banks, in the third quarter of 1995 they were over 120%. At
the same time, the ratio of tax arrears to the overdue payments to suppliers increased
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from 30% to 45%. The isolation of enterprise nancing from the budget never completely
occurred.
3 Main Trends of Enterprises Behavior in the
Stabilization Environment
3.1 Production and Demand
The stabilization of industrial production in the latter half of 1994{1995 is closely related
to the slow-down of decline in domestic and the expansion of external demand. Surveys
show that enterprises largely assess domestic demand (and the portfolio of orders) as
decient (the negative appraisal balance). As of mid-1994, the demand situation showed
signs of improvement (Figure 1). To a large degree, this resulted from the money infusion
in mid-1994 and the stabilization of real money supply in 1995.
The eect of monetary policies on production at enterprises is becoming increasingly
indirect, for not all the uctuations of the money emission are transformed into a change in
demand and the replenishment of enterprise liquid resources. In addition to this, industrial
enterprises only account for about 22% of funds in the settlement accounts of enterprises
and organizations (or nearly 4% of M2). Demand has a positive eect both on production
and prices for manufactured products. In 1995, with relatively tight monetary policy and
the acceleration of cost-push ination (primarily on the part of natural monopolies), the
price movements were becoming less sensitive to change in demand (Figure 2).
1994{1995 saw a number of new trends in the production to demand relation:
1. Enterprises did their best to eliminate excessive inventories of nished products,
and that markedly limited the self-suciency of production. According to the sur-
veys of the Institute for the Economy in Transition (IET), in the fourth quarter of
1994 the balance between enterprises with excessive and decient inventories was
virtually reduced to zero. In the second half of 1995, the negative eect of decline
in demand was mitigated by the inventory increase above (the general managers'
assessment) the normal level (the stabilization of the aggregate appraisal of demand
and inventories, Figure 1). The enterprises' shift to the policy of accelerated in-
ventory turnover was caused both by the generally increasing nancial constraints
on enterprises' operations and the pressure of high real interest rates. With the
increasing nancial constraints and expensive credits, \the freezing" of the working
capital in the excessive inventory became unaordable.
2. Disequilibrium of demand and supply. While in 1993{rst quarter of 1994, accord-
ing to the general managers' appraisals (Russian Economic Barometer | REB),
production was above the level of normal demand, beginning mid-1994 output was
steadily lagging behind normal demand (about 15%). The IET's surveys also indi-
cate the disappearance of excessive production by early 1994 and the convergence
8
of the normal demand and output levels in 1995. Subjective appraisals of the ratios
of normal to actual values of supply and demand corroborate: (a) the data of the
surveys indicating that the major production bottlenecks are accounted for by other
factors than demand, largely nancial ones; and (b) the existence of the production
growth potential with the current demand pattern.
In the fourth quarter of 1995 this ratio appeared to be disturbed (according to IET's
estimates) due to the sharp demand squeeze which threatened with a new wave of
production decline. Moreover, this excessive supply runs counter to the output and
demand convergence expected by enterprises and discernible at the moment (Figure
3). All this makes the demand-encouraging policy very relevant.
3. Surveys inadequately reect demand generated by exports (the IET has been mon-
itoring these since 1995), which boosted the raw materials sector and promoted the
stabilization of the industrial output index. As the ruble appreciated, the appraisals
of export demand started decreasing (in the fourth quarter of 1995 they were 12%
lower than in the rst quarter), while the overall index of enterprises' dissatisfaction
with export demand is three times lower than the values related to home demand.
3.2 Financial Condition
The enterprises' short-term nancial condition is represented by their earnings and ex-
penses pattern, the availability of working capital and their ability to pay on debt obli-
gations. The main trends of the nancial condition during stabilization are:
1. The stabilization in 1995 of the availability of the working capital, especially highly
liquid, along with the acceleration of stock turnover. This stabilization was perpet-
uating the lag between output and potential demand.
2. With the slowing ination and the long-standing production crisis, the enterprises'
nancial condition depended upon the availability of funds in their accounts rather
than upon the protability and earnings dynamics (Figure 4). One should also note
the sharp increase of \competition for liquidity" between payments to suppliers,
those to the budget and wage payments. Unfortunately, the surveys do not reveal
the changes in enterprises' liquidity.
3. The adjustment of depreciation charges for ination and prots growth in 1995
notwithstanding, a trend towards the decrease in the availability of net working
capital to enterprises persisted, which triggered the growth of payables | especially
to the budget system (Figure 5). While in late 1993{early 1994 the tax arrears were
about 24% of the overdue payments to suppliers, by late 1995 they rose to 40{45%,
with the absolute amounts of tax arrears steadily outrunning the amounts of bank
loans to industrial enterprises (though compared to the budget, banks provide more
liquid resources).
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The surveys of the Centre for Economic Analysis provide appraisals by enterprises of
the availability of internal (not borrowed) nancial resources which is closely related to
the appraisals of enterprises' nancial and economic condition. The drop in the balance
of internal funds availability from {17% in June to {26% in October was accompanied by
the declining appraisal of industrial enterprises nancial condition from {47 to {49.
3.3 Factors Restraining Growth
As enterprise behavior becomes more commerciallymotivated and their monetary policies
tightened, their production activities increasingly depend on their nancial state (though
in late 1995 the relative signicance of demand has somewhat grown). As potential
demand failed to be realized, liquid nancial resources were causing problems rather
than inventories (\production assets", using the terminology of the Federal Agency for
Bankruptcies). Arrears, due to their low liquidity and toughening of the terms of inter-
enterprise settlements, turned from an output-supporting (1992) to an output-restraining
factor, thus enhancing the negative eect of cost-push ination. Their role was reversed
in mid-1994, when the arrears, instead of propping up production, started to keep aoat
enterprises which were at a standstill. Econometric calculations corroborate the negative
eect of the growth of receivables as well as the growth of receivables and payables ratio
on output in 1994{95.
The demarcation line between demand-determined and nancial factors is not clear-
cut. Current assets are a demand-forming factor with respect to inventories; their level is
linked to the prices for enterprises' products and thereby to the state of demand. At the
same time, nancial assets (especially receivables and nancial investments) have their
own movement pattern which is signicantly dierent from the production and demand
movement; this results in a gap between the production level, corresponding to potential
demand, and nancial resources available.
According to REB estimates, enterprises considered demand decit to be the principal
cause of production decline in 1992 (the ratio of demand appraisal to the appraisal of
nancial resources as the output-constraining factors exceeded 1). In 1993{early 1995, the
biggest production bottleneck was working capital. In structuring the causes of industrial
enterprises stoppages, nancial constraints became prevalent, although this shift only
occurred in late 1994.
3.4 Enterprises Dierentiation
What characterizes the stabilization period is the expansion of the group of enterprises
that are steadily increasing output, have growing inventories and are in a relatively healthy
nancial condition (they evaluate it as \good" or \normal"). On the other hand, this
group represents a minority of industrial enterprises including, in all likelihood, those
who have learned how to survive rather than those who displayed the ability to develop
production and attain a good nancial and economic condition.
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While during the period of the accelerated fall of output the share of relatively suc-
cessful enterprises (REB survey data) was declining at the same pace as the industrial
output index, in 1994{rst half of 1995 this group of enterprises was growing against the
background of the stabilization of general industrial trends (Figure 7).
It should be noted that the discrepancies between the dynamics of general industrial
output indicators and nancial indicators shown by the surveys might be due to the fact
that the sample included mostly medium-sized enterprises, while the nancial problems
are more serious with large-sized enterprises, which accounts for the lower average output
gures. The surveys practically failed to cover the \ops" where losses and stoppages are
typical. According to GOSKOMSTAT (the State Statistics Committee of the Russian
Federation) data, in 1994{95 the average of about 5,000 enterprises, i.e., about 25% of all
industrial enterprises, had stoppages and sustained losses. Thus, the unsuccessful group
is only slightly smaller than the successful one which, according to the REB estimates,
included 29% of the enterprises in 1995 (up from 24% in 1994 and down from 36% in 1993),
with a sharp growth of both groups having occurred almost simultaneously in mid-1994.
Surveys conducted by the Centre for Economic Analysis show a higher share of the
enterprises which were satised with their nancial and economic condition: about 50% of
the sample (or about 2% of large- and medium-sized industrial enterprises), but the share
of those that assess their position as \good" is only 1{2%. The gap between the data
of the above surveys probably reects both the structural element (the survey conducted
by the Centre for Economic Analysis better represents raw materials producers) and the
appraisal gradation (satisfactory/good).
It is evident that the factors bringing about the success of the enterprises are specic to
individual enterprises and related to the style of management, labor relations, the specic
features of production and the market niche found. At the same time, the surveys show
that the dynamics of the successful group correspond to the other trends. The Centre
for Economic Analysis surveys indicate that the share of enterprises satised with the
level of output is practically the same as the share of those satised with their nancial
condition, which conrms a close relationship between nancial activities and production.
An increase in the portion of enterprises that are in a good and normal nancial condition
depends both on the ability of the companies to expand the portfolio of orders and output
and the pace of price rises (consequently, the protability level). At the same time, the
number of enterprises increasing output has been steadily outrunning the number of those
who are in a nancially sound condition (by about 20% in 1995) which testies to a certain
conict of nancial and production priorities.
4 Types and Models of Production Activities
The classical theory of the rm views the operations of an enterprise primarily from the
standpoint of the maximization of the rm's objectives (output or market share | for a
competing rm; prot | for a capitalist rm; value added | for an enterprise with strong
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participation of employees in management), given resource limitations. For an enterprise
operating in a transition economy Kornai developed the following approach. Instead of
the optimization problem, to the fore comes the challenge of tightening budget constraints
and changing the comparative role of factors limiting output, with the main role played
now by demand and nancial factors, as opposed to the factor of material resources. If
the establishment of a relationship between demand/nancial constraints and industrial
output is the imperative of the transition period, then the comparative eect of these
factors and the structure of demand and nancial parameters are largely determined by
the behavioral elements at the microeconomic level.
In 1992{1995, four principal types of production behavior can be identied in the
Russian economy. The main dierence between them lies in the relation of factors limiting
output and in the structure of nancial parameters | rather than in the objectives
which enterprises seek to attain. We do not claim that these types cover the whole
variety of behavioral patterns of enterprises. They classify production activities from
the perspective of tightening enterprise budget constraints and the related change in the
production decline factors. We are not examining behavior based on the monopolistic price
rises. Such behavior is not predominant in the nal manufacturing industries oriented
towards domestic demand. In 1993{95 (unlike 1992) the enterprises' freedom of price-
setting was quite restricted here. The movements of prices are determined by the cost-
push ination generated by fuel and raw materials sectors and natural monopolies. For
this reason, output inventory uctuations and related changes in working capital are
becoming the main adaptive variable.
The following types of production behavior were eshed out.
(R) Resource-oriented behavior | output is limited by the availability of production
resources. This type was predominant in the centralized economy of shortages, but
production distortions due to unprecedented output decline for several recent years
provoked a new increase of resource constraints (the increasing contribution of which
in the output fall was also shown by the surveys).
(D) Behavior oriented towards demand and the ow of current revenues. Output is de-
termined by eective demand or revenues (value added), or | in more capitalized
enterprises | by prots. An enterprise adapts to the gap between potential de-
mand and real receipts through the output and barter drop along with adopting
other enterprises' nancial resources. Payables are determined by the dynamics of
receivables and are the price that has to be paid for excessive production.
(F) Behavior oriented towards self-nancing and maintaining the necessary level of liq-
uidity. Output is adapted to the nancial capacities of an enterprise, i.e., to the
real receipts, the suciency of liquidity for supporting turnover and the pressure of
cost-push ination.
12
(S) Behavior oriented towards survival in a sense of retaining the \enterprise identity"
(type of operations, number of employees (\working collective"), the control over an
enterprise by the managerial \technostructure". This type of production activities
corresponds to the so-called company-family (typical both of Japan and the Soviet
system). On the other hand, this type implies a structural rather than a behavioral
aspect. In sectors hit by the structural crisis (the defense industry, production
of sophisticated durable consumer goods) running at 20{30% of capacity and less,
many enterprises are in the state of \hidden bankruptcy". Though output \matches"
real demand, the retention of the production potential and survival of a company
as such is only possible through funds provided by creditors (those are primarily
suppliers and the budget). Payables are no more directly related to receivables.
As the specically oriented surveys show, companies in a \bad" nancial condition
(having losses) are characterized by an increased share of arrears to the budget and
extra budgetary funds.
The dierence between the above types (especially between types D and F) is quite
relative, for enterprises' reorientation to be real rather than potential demand and the
decrease of payables should restore the relationship between output and liquidity. From
the nancial standpoint, type D is characterized by the leading role of enterprises' ac-
tive operations and nancing mostly through debt. At type F enterprises production is
typically subordinate to the structure of assets, and an emphasis is put on self-nancing.
It is impossible to measure the actual correlation of the above types of behavior in
the industrial sector (and its subsectors) based on the undertaken surveys. This calls for
the use of dierent analytical techniques. At the same time, it may be suggested that on
the microlevel the predominant occurrence of the F and S types of production activities
corresponds to the macroshift of decline factors from demand to the working capital decit.
In industrial capitalist countries, a shift towards similar behavior is characteristic to the
periods of market (conjuncture) crises. It sounds unlikely that in the Russian economy
enterprises consciously adapt output to liquidity-determined constraints. It is more likely
that what counts here is the availability of liquid resources, not only the material ones,
for production and marketing performance.
At the same time, the toughening of relations with suppliers (hampering or stopping
crediting through arrears) makes for a lasting objective relationship between output and
the ratio of funds available in enterprises' accounts to the amount of short-term debt.
On the other hand, the development of the bankruptcy procedures, the slow-down of
settlements, a system of advance tax payments and a drastically growing need to cover
risks, make for an additional accumulation of liquid resources that is not directly related
to production.
Let us draw up main equations revealing the above types of production behavior:
D is a model of demand-oriented production.
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(1) pQ = S | IZ Q | output measured in xed prices;
(2) S = DP = aD S | sales; p | product price;
(3) S | M = VAD IZ | change in inventories;
(4) S = cPR DP | real demand;
(5) F = S + ED D | potential demand
M | materials costs; VAD | value added; PR | prot-brutto (expected or current);
c | coecient, reverse (inverse{?) to the share of prot in the price of production; a |
demand eectiveness ratio measured by change in arrears and the scale of barter; F |
nancial assets; ED | surplus of external debt.
The enterprises' freedom of choice under this model (when prices of production are
determined by the dynamics of prices for the purchased raw materials) is manifested in the
trade-o between change in output and inventories, as well as the amount of receivables
(i.e., parameter | (a) bridging the gap between real and potential demand and external
debt (ED) needed to keep output up with demand.
F is a nance-oriented model.
pQ = FV F | nancial assets (or current assets in general)
V is the rate of capital turnover which depends both on macroregulators (interest rate,
ination rate) and the structure of assets and liabilities of an enterprise, the methods
of settlements with customers and suppliers. F is supposed to be determined by mostly
internal funds (borrowing is minimized), whereas V depends positively on the protability
and the share of money in the structure of nancial assets.
The freedom of choice is primarily displayed through the actions aimed at bringing
about change in the velocity of nancial and production capital turnover.
C is a combination model showing the relationship between the nancing and demand
factors.
pQ = [ DF ], [ FF ], [ IN ]
DF is a factor of demand (potential, real) and income from the products sale; FF is
integral assessment of enterprises' nancial conditions (availability of working capital and
the critical funds; level of solvency); IN is an indicator of output decline inertia or of
output \autonomous" dynamics determined by non-nancial and non-demand factors.
5 Principal Results of Econometric Analysis of
Production Activities
Equations of the models of production activities identied above produce similar results.
The assessment period was 10.1992{9.1995. At the moments of sharp changes in the
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behavioral patterns (5.1994 | a surge of stoppages and arrears, and 5.1995{9.1995 |
domestic demand squeeze and the rising role of external demand), the quality of regression
assessments deteriorates with respect to both demand and nancial factors.
5.1 Relation of Production to Demand
Econometric calculations corroborate a close relationship between the dynamics of output
measured in xed prices in manufacturing industries (without the fuel and energy sector)
and changes in demand. As far as the demand factor is concerned, the best results for the
reviewed period were obtained by the IET with respect to the volume of paid shipments
(which serve as a current revenue indicator), and the balance assessment of demand. All
the demand factors within the reviewed period show rather high stability of the regression
coecients.
(D1) IQT = :68 IQT [ 1]
:7
Dbal
07
standard error | 3.2%, R**2 = .93
IQT | index of output in processing industries in 1990 prices by 12.1991 (trend);
demand factor Dbal | the balance of demand assessments (above normal{lower than
normal), according to IET surveys, increased by the constant of 100. The introduction
of the constant is caused by the negative balance of demand assessment. As the balance
assessment of demand pertains to the beginning of a month, the equation shows the
anticipating (+1 month) inuence of demand on production. The use of the demand
indicator with a one month lag slightly increases the average deviation error.
Econometric analysis conrms the relation of demand dynamics (assessments in sur-
veys) to money supply (M2 in real terms, with a two month lag) on the macrolevel and
to protability (or real prot) on the microlevel.
The use of nished products inventory as the indicators of demand (eect of inventories
on demand and output is assumed to be negative) deteriorates statistical estimates, as the
regression coecients show a drastic change in mid-1994{early 1995. The instability of
relation of output elasticity ratios to the inventory size results from enterprises shifting to
the acceleration of inventory and receivables turnover. At the same time, the surveys data
about the actual nished products inventories may be used for forecasting the dynamics
of enterprises inventories and current assets in general (in 1993, the correlation of survey
estimates | with a four month lag | with the data provided in a monthly reporting form
was .7).
The index of capacity utilization has proved to most closely correlate with the index
of output in the xed prices (REB) in the assessment of production represented in the
surveys (for one factor dependence) with a free term R**2 = .85, standard error | 8%.
It should be noted that in the surveys conducted by the REB enterprises display the so-
called normal (economical) rate of utilization of about 60% which includes a certain level
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of normally idle capacities (20%). As a result, the rate of utilization capacity is assessed
as 45{50% which is comparable to the ocial data.
5.2 Dependence of Production on Enterprises' Financial
Condition
Output depends on the ow of current revenues and the availability of money (nancial
assets). Prot is supposed to have a multiple function. It is an objective of a capitalized
enterprise operation (current or expected prot) and a most important source of nancing
of working capital (and other types of activities). Among the indicators of an enterprise's
nancial condition, the gure of real amounts of money in enterprises' accounts was
shown to be most closely related to production. This suggests that it is the availability of
funds that has become the main limiting factor in the current economic situation (thus
decreasing the importance of inventory and debt).
It is noteworthy that the reliable estimates of the dependence of output on nancing
parameters were only based on the GOSKOMSTAT data, for the surveys do not provide
sucient nancial information. The assessment of \the share of enterprises evaluating
their nancial condition as normal or sound" (REB) based on those surveys have no
visible relation either to the dynamics of industrial production or solvency ratios. The
statistically signicant positive dependence (after smoothing) was only found to be true
with respect to the industrial sector protability.
(F1) IQT = :94 IQT[ 1]
:65
IL
:08
standard error | 3.7%, R**2 = .93
IQT | the trend of output in the xed prices in the nal industries; IL | the index
of money amounts in enterprises' accounts (as of the middle of a month) in 1.1992 prices.
The results practically do not deteriorate if the index of money amounts is used with a
two month lag. The regression ratios were stable over the entire period.
Such indicators as prot (in comparable prices), the absolute liquidity ratio or the
complex index of an enterprise's nancial condition (including the indexes of protability,
turnover of nancial assets and ability to pay o debt) used as a factor of nancial
condition yield the estimates R
2
of about .9{.92 and a standard error of 3.8{4%. At the
same time, the elasticity of production index based on the above factors was steadily
declining in 1994{1995. The peak of output sensitivity to prot occurred in the rst half
of 1993, which corresponded to the period of high ination-induced protability, while
with respect to the complex nancial assessment the peak was late 1993{early 1994.
It might well be that thanks to the high sensitivity of production to these nancial
parameters their sharp drop in the second half of 1993 played a key role in the acceleration
of the recession and production decline below the level determined by demand constraints
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as such. As the economy was moving over to the state of stabilization and slower ination,
new conditions for nancing production were formed, which was reected in the lower
sensitivity (elasticity) of output to protability and solvency bringing to the fore the
availability of highly liquid resources and orders. Let us test this hypothesis by assessing
the relation of output to the combined eect of demand and nancial conditions.
5.3 The Relation Between Demand and Financial Factors of
Production
Let us consider the two types of relations below:
(C1) IQT = :722 IQT [ 1]
:55
IL
:057
Dbal
:059
standard error | 3.2%, R**2 = .94
IQT is a trend of output in the xed prices in nal industries; IL is an index of funds in
industrial enterprises' accounts; Dbal is an estimate of demand (according to the surveys).
(C2) IQT = :76 IQT [ 1]
:58
IK
:135
Dbal
:06
standard error | 3.2%, R** = .94
The average quality of the statistical estimates of the two equations coincides, but the
dynamics of ratios over the reviewed period are dierent. The sensitivity of the output to
the complex estimate of the nancial condition decreases, and in the second half of 1995
this factor was no longer relevant. The strongest relationship and the nancing factor
supremacy over the demand factor (with respect to the elasticity level) occurred in the
second half of 1993{early 1994, i.e., during the sharp acceleration of production decline
and the establishment of tougher payment relations rules (Figure 10). The use of money
supply (M2 in real terms) as a demand factor produces a similar picture.
In contrast, the elasticity of production with respect to enterprises' funds is rather
stable; in 1995 it was not much dierent from demand elasticity (Figure 11). Behind
the dierence between the dynamics of elasticity ratios there may well be two landmarks
representing the toughening of enterprises nancing constraints. The rst one (beginning
mid-1993) was related to the establishment of a close relationship between production
activities and the levels of enterprises' revenues and debt (the structure of debt, the rate of
turnover and balance of payables and receivables). The second one (beginning mid-1994)
is characterized by highly-liquid (money) assets turning into the greatest bottleneck of
production and the decrease of the shock-absorbing role of current revenues (swallowed by
arrears) and enterprises mutual arrears. The symptom of moving to the second landmark
was a surge of enterprises' stoppages in the summer of 1994 followed by a qualitative
change of stoppages: the leading role was at that moment played by the stoppages caused
by the lack of current assets as opposed to stoppages induced by the lack of demand.
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Figure 1. Dynamics of Supply and Demand
Figure 2. Dynamics of Prices and Demand
21
Figure 3. Adjustment of Supply to Demand (REB Survey)
Figure 4. Dynamics of Supply and Financial State
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Figure 5. Own Funds (Equity)
Figure 6. The Relation Between Demand and Financial Factors of Output (on results of
survey, nancial factor = 100%)
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Figure 7. Dynamics of Financial State of Firms and Share of Firms in Good or Normal
Financial Position
Figure 8. Dynamics of Share of Firms in a Good or Normal Financial Position and Prices
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Figure 9. Dynamics of Shares of Firms in a Good Financial Position and Firms with
Increasing Output (REB Survey)
Figure 10. Output Elasticity from Financial and Demand Factors
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Figure 11. Output Elasticity from Financial and Demand Factors
Figure 12. Dynamics of Output and Expectations
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Table 1: Financial Flows of Industrial Enterprises (cumulative, in % to proceeds)
First Quarter
1993 1994 1995
State budget
tax burden {25 {22 {18
Including debts to state budget {20 {17 {11
budget nancing 6 4 2
saldo {14 {13 {9
Credits 12 15 11
Net prot in % to total prot 68 59 78
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
Table 2: Financial Results of Production
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Protability (prot to costs) 12 23.7 40.4 32 18.3
Annual protability
a
639.6 314 156.6 52.9
Wasteful enterprises
b
13 7.8 22.5
Prot rate of current capital
c
8.8 10.8 9.8 5.2
Gross prot %
d
100 115.4 63.9 23.3
a
| annual protability (taking into account capital turnover velocity) to interest rate of three month
credits.
b
| In % of total amount of enterprises.
c
| Monthly relation of gross prot to net current capital (without credits).
d
| In December 1991 prices.
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
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Table 3: Structure of Current Capital (at the end of the period)
1988 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
Assets (100%)
inventory 70 67 62 36 40 36
nancial assets 30 33 38 64 60 64
debtors 19 14 23 47 50 50
short-term loans 0.4 0.8 1 1 4
money 6.9 11.8 9.3 14 8 5
including foreign currency 7 4 2
Liabilities
own capital 37 62.4 60 30 25.5 16.7
bank debts 31 21 13 11 9.3 11
credit debts 33 17 28 60 65.2 72
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
Table 4: Turnover (in days of sales)
Fourth First Second Third Fourth Third
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 1995
Current capital 111 172 175 173 133 141
inventory 43 67 65 62 48 57
nancial assets 68 105 110 111 85 83
debtors 55 81 82 87 66 71
money 9 11 10 10 6 5
Own current capital 28 29 34 31 22 24
Production assets
a
37 91 50 36 27 31
a
| production assets | production stocks (without nished inventory) and money deposits.
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
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Table 5: Solvency (%)
Fourth Fourth Fourth Third
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
1992 1993 1994 1995
Current liquidity 141 134 120 120
Time liquidity 90 82 76 71
Absolute liquidity 21 12 10 6
for money 20 11 6 4
Debtors/creditors 78 76 69 68
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
Table 6: Inationary Tax and Income (% to output)
Fourth First Second Third Fourth First
Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter Quarter
1993 1994 1994 1994 1994 1995
Seigniorage {1.4 {0.7 {0.6 {0.4 {0.5 {0.7
In % to money assets {10.9 {5.9 {4.9 {3 {5.5 {8.9
Inationary income 3.6 5.6 1.9 5.4 5.1 2.6
including unpayments 42.7 60.5 46.4 40.6 35.4 39.3
Source: Goskomstat data, database of A. Belousov group, and the group N. Kozlov from the Institute of
Economic Forecasting.
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